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FOREIGN TAX CLAIMS AND JUDGMENTS IN
CANADIAN COURTS
J.-G . CASTEL*
Toronto
Introduction
In the last thirty years the general trend in most countries of the
world has been towards a substantial increase in tax rates to enable
governments to face up to new economic and social commitments.
In many instances the income, estate or sales levy will consume
more than half of the property or profit taxed providing a strong
incentive for tax avoidance. A tax dodger will convert an inherited
fortune into cash and move to another country, State or province,
or owing income taxes will abandon his domicile or residence
without leaving any property that can be 'seized in satisfaction of
the tax claim, or also remove his earnings from the place in which
they accrue before the taxing authority has any opportunity to
attach them or remove the property subject to tax to another juris-
diction . Other similar examples come readily to mind. In other
words in the typical situation a State levies a valid tax and then
finds itself unable to collect it within its own borders because the
prospective taxpayer has physically removed himself and his at-
tachable property therefrom either innocently or with the avowed
purpose of avoiding payment of the tax. If the State that imposed
the tax sues him in the State or province of his new residence, the
action is likely to be met with the defence that "no country ever
takes notice of the revenue laws of another" . These words, uttered
by way of dictum by Lord Mansfield in 1775 1 in an era of virulent
commercial rivalry, political nationalism andinternationalsuspicion
have been responsible in great part for the success of modern inter-
national tax evasion or avoidance, a recognized evil from both a
moral and economic point of view. As evidenced by a recent deci-
sion of the Supreme Court of Canada2 this judicial doctrine is still
~'J-G . Castel, S.J.D ., of Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto.
1 Holman v . Johnson (1775), 1 Cowp. 341, 98 E.R. 1120.
a United States of America v . Harden, [19631 S.C.R. 366, (1963), 44
W.W.R . 630, (1964), 41 D.L.R . (2d) 721 .
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vigorous in this country in spite ofthemodern spirit ofinternational
co-operation in the field of taxation . In the absence of specific treaty
provisions, no matter how conscious and deliberate the tax eva-
sion, there are no judicial or administrative remedies available to
the defrauded State or province outside its territorial jurisdiction .
Although the dogmatic rule did not originate with cases in-
volving attempts to collect a tax, but had its inception in cases
raising the question whether a contract that did not comply with
the revenue laws of the place where made was enforceable in the
forum, today a foreign tax claim will not be recognized and en-
forced directly or indirectly in Canadian courts .
The judicial protection afforded tax dodgers that enables them
to escape from tax liabilities lawfully imposed is highly immoral
as the tax burden is a tolerable thing only when it is fairly distrib-
uted . Complete evasion or avoidance by some increases the burden
of others . Furthermore the attitude of the courts casts disrespect
upon the law. Why is it unlawful in Canada to evade local taxes
and yet perfectly legitimate to refuse to pay foreign taxes? Howcan
the public policy of Canada be invoked to protect foreign tax
dodgers when our own legislative bodies impose similar taxes?
There can only be one concept of public policy in this respect. Why
not consider an obligation to pay taxes validly imposed as binding
as the obligation to pay a private debt voluntarily undertaken?
It is comforting to note that many American States as well as
the Province of Quebec have tried to plug this legal loophole by
passing statutes that provide for the reciprocal enforcement of tax
claims .' Even if a certain amount of caution should be exercised
with respect to the recognition and enforcement of tax claims of
foreign countries, at least on the interprovincial level, the rule laid
down by Lord Mansfield should be rejected . There is no reason
why special conflict rules could not be devised to deal with the
international recognition and enforcement of tax claims. Resort
to international treaties is not the only available method to correct
the evils stemming from the application of Lord Mansfield's
dictum .
1. United States of America v. Harden.
Only recently and for the first time in Canadian legal history, a
foreign government sought to resort to Canadian courts to obtain
payment of taxes lawfully imposed. In United States of America v.
Harden,4 the plaintiff sued the defendant in British Columbia upon
a See section IV infra. 4 Supra, footnote 1.
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a money judgment of the United States District Court of the
Southern District of California . The defendant in moving to set
aside the writ of summons and subsequent garnishee proceedings
alleged that the judgment was founded upon her indebtedness for
United States taxes assessed upon her income and that the British
Columbia courts have no jurisdiction to entertain a claim to en-
force either directly or indirectly the revenue laws of a foreign
State. The plaintiff sought to escape the application of the rule to
the case by submitting that despite Lord Mansfield's dictum, a
foreign judgment for payment of such taxes should be enforced
as it constitutes a new obligation in which the original cause of
action is merged. The plaintiff also submitted that Canadian courts
will enforce an agreement by way of compromise made for valu-
able consideration to pay an amount of money in satisfaction of
a claim for foreign taxes. The argument was that since the original
judgment in the case was obtained by "stipulation" of counsel at
a pre-trial conference in California, it converted the original cause
of action for taxes into one of contract . The original claim for
income tax had disappeared in the judgment, giving rise to a
promise to pay, andin the result the action was not one to enforce
directly or indirectly the revenue laws of a foreign State.
In the British Columbia Supreme Court,' Maclean 3. relying
upon Wisconsin v. Pelican, Ins. Co.' was of the opinion that :
The essential nature and real foundation of a cause of action are not
changed by recovering judgment upon it ; and the technical rules which
regard the original claim as merged in the judgment, and the judgment
as implying a promise by the defendant to pay it, do not preclude a
court, to which a judgment is presented for affirmative action (while
it cannot go behind the judgment for the purpose of examining into
the validity of the claim), from ascertaining whether the claim is really
one of such nature that the court is authorized to enforce it.
His view was that enforcement must not depend merely upon
the form in which the claim is made . It is not a question whether
the plaintiff is a foreign State or the representative of a foreign
State or its revenue authority. In every case the substance of the
claim must be scrutinized, and if it then appears that it is really a
suit brought for the purpose of collecting the debts of a foreign
revenue it must be rejected . Furthermore it is an elementary prin-
ciple of the law of recognition and enforcement of foreign judg-
ments in Canada that a foreign judgment does not merge the ori-
ginal cause of action. The plaintiff may always disregard a foreign
s (1961), 30 D.L.R . (2d) 566, (l961), 35 W.W.R . 654 (B.C.S.C.) .
6 (1838), 127 U.S . 265, at pp . 292-293 .
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judgment rendered in his favour and sue on the original cause of
action?
Maclean J. concluded that since in his opinion the substance
of the claim was foreign taxes, it followed that the fact that the
claim appeared in the form of ajudgment did not entitle it to any
different consideration it would have received in the form of a
foreign tax assessment .
Thejudge also xejected the plaintiff's submission that a foreign
judgment for taxes obtained on a "stipulation" by the defendant's
attorney converted what was a cause of action for taxes into one
of contract. He said : s
Here the defendant, a California resident, was faced with a large claim
for United States taxes . Her attorney at first denied liability but on a
pre-trial hearing successfully convinced the judge and apparently the
counsel for the Government that the whole amount claimed was not
in fact owing, and by stipulation judgment was entered for the lesser
sum . I fail to see how it can be said that the resulting judgment is other
than a judgment for taxes . All that the defendant did in the circum-
stances was to resist the claim as far as she could with a view to min-
imizing the resulting judgment, a tactic that is commonly employed
both at pre-trial conferences and at trials . To use the words of Moore
J ., in Peter Buchanan Ltd. & Machary v. McVey, [1955] A.C . 516, at
p . 529 : "In every case the substance of the claim must be scrutinized,
and if it then appears that it is really a suit brought for the purpose of
collecting the debts of a foreign revenue it must be rejected ." I do not
think that it can be said that the judgment obtained by stipulation
brought into being any cause of action for anything other than foreign
taxes.
This judgment was affirmed by the British Columbia Court of
Appeal .' Sheppard J.A ., who delivered the unanimous decision of
the court restated the principle that, as a matter of public policy,
the British Columbia courts will not entertain an action brought
by an individual or a public authority or the representative of such
authority which directly or indirectly has the effect of enforcing
the revenue laws of a foregin country. However he was willing to
admit that difficulties have arisen from time to time in applying
the rule to cover newcircumstances. He also aptly remarked that : t°
If the plaintiff's submission is sound a foreign State having recovered
judgment in its own courts for taxes that it could not recover directly
' See Industrial Acceptance Corp . Ltd. v . Stevenson (1963), 43 W.W.R .
126 (Sask.) ; Read, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
(1938), p . 111 ; Castel, The Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Money Judgments or Decrees in the Anglo-American Common Law
System and in the French Civil Law System (1958), p . 110.
8 Supra, footnote 5, at p . 571 (D.L.R.) .
1 (1962), 36 D.L.R . (2d) 602, (1962-63), 40 W.W.R . 428 .
11 Ibid., at p . 606 (D .L.R.) .
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in Canadian courts, could then sue and recover in Canadian courts
on that judgment no matter how offensive the tax might be to Canad-
ian sovereignty or how injurious to Canadian economy. The reasons
which require Canadian courts to reject claims by or on behalf of
foreign States for taxes due under their revenue laws likewise require
Canadian courts to reject claims of foreign States upon judgments
recovered in their courts for such taxes . It is the duty of our courts to
go behind the foreign judgment to see if in substance it is one for
foreign taxes .
This reasoning does not mean that the foreign judgment is not
conclusive on the merits . We are concerned here with a prelim-
inary question : is this a type of judgment susceptible of enforce-
ment in Canadian courts? Actually, if the rule prohibiting the
enforcement of revenue laws is based on public policy, it would
seem that even in the absence of such a rule ; a judgment for taxes
could be refused enforcement when contrary to the public policy
of the forum as the defence of public policy is always available in
conflict of laws cases to prevent the application of the lawnormally
applicable.
Initially the forum must determine the substance of the right
sought to be enforced ; and whether its enforcement would, either
directly or indirectly involve the execution of a revenue law of an-
other State." The court at this preliminary stage of the proceed-
ings must go behind the foreign judgment to ascertain not the
validity of the claim on which it is based, butwhether the judgment
involves a type of claim that should not be enforced in the forum.
In fact the enquiry is directed to the jurisdiction rationae materiae
of the enforcing court. The court is dealing indirectly with a pre-
liminary objection to its jurisdiction to entertain a suit for the en-
forcement of foreign taxes. The rule adopted in most Canadian
provinces that foreign judgments are conclusive on the merits
neither supports nor detracts from the principle that foreign rev-
enue laws are unenforceable in the courts ofthe provinces.12 It was
therefore not necessary for the Court of Appeal to cite Walker v.
Witter11 for the proposition that "Foreign judgments are a ground
of action everywhere, but they are examinable . . ." . Equally ir-
relevant is the non-merger rule .
In British Columbia a foreign judgment operates neither by
merger nor by satisfaction. The original cause of action remains to
be enforced by action equally as if there were no foreign judgment,
'1 See Huntington v . Attrill, [1893] A.C. 150, at p. 155, 62 L.7.P.C. 44,
68 L.T. 326 (P.C .), see also (1892), 146 U.S . 657,13 S . Ct . 224 (U.S . S . Ct .) .
12 Castel, Private International Law (1960), p . 270 .
13 (1778), 1 Doug. 1, 99 E.R. 1, at p . 6 .
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and on that original cause of action the foreign judgment is merely
evidence of an implied promise to pay. Thus the court was of
the opinion that the enforcement of the California judgment
would amount to the enforcement of the original cause of action
namely a claim on behalf of a foreign State to recover taxes due
under its law."
The judgment of the Court of Appeal was upheld by a unan-
imous Supreme Court of Canada. Cartwright J. who wrote the
judgment of the court, said in part : 1e
In my opinion, a foreign State cannot escape the application of this
rule, [that foreign States cannot directly or indirectly enforce their tax
claims here] which is one of public policy, by taking a judgment in its
own courts and bringing suit here on that judgment . The claim as-
serted remains a claim for taxes. It has not, in our courts, merged in
the judgment ; enforcement of the judgment would be enforcement of
the tax claim.
Similarly, in my opinion, the argument that the claim asserted is
simply for the performance of an agreement, made for good considera-
tion, to pay a stated sum of money must also fail. We are concerned
not with form but with substance, and if it can properly be said that
the respondent made an agreement it was simply an agreement to pay
taxes which by the laws ofthe foreign state she was obligated to pay .
Neither the foreign judgment nor the agreement does more than make
certain the fact and the amount of the respondent's liability to the
appellant . The nature of the liability is not altered . It is a liability to
pay income tax .
He concluded by approving Sheppard J.A.'s view that it is the
duty of the courts to go behind the judgment to ascertain the sub-
stance or nature of the claim on which it is based. At last in Canada
the plea of "foreign revenue law" has been heard at the highest
judicial level and the principle affirmed that foreign States cannot
directly or indirectly enforce their tax claims here.
There is little that can be said with respect to the decisions of
the various courts in United States of America v. Harden except
that they accord with English judicial tradition . It must also be
emphasized that the decision of the Supreme Court applies only
to tax judgments obtained in foreign countries. Whether the court
would be prepared to extend Lord Mansfield's rule to the enforce-
Supra, footnote 9, at p . 608 (D.L.R .) .
Supra, footnote 2, at p . 635 (W.W.R .) . An interesting point is whether
the Supreme Court feels bound by the decision of the House of Lords in
Government of India, Ministry of Finance (Revenue Division) v. Taylor,
[1955] A.C . 491 aff'ing in re Delhi Electric Supply and Traction Co . Ltd.,
[1954] Ch. 131, [1953] 2 All E.R . 1452 . Although the court relied on the
case to reach its decision, it did not refer to the doctrine of stare decisis .
Cartwright J. merely said : "For the reasons given by Sheppard J.A . and
those I have stated above I would [dismiss the appeal] . . .", at p . 636
(W . W.R.).
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ment of provincial claims or judgments for taxes remains an open
question .
The only other instance where a Canadian court was faced
with a problem of direct enforcement of foreign taxes is City of
Regina v . McVey." In an action brought against a person resident
in Ontario to recover income taxes due to the municipality .before
he left Saskatchewan the plaintiff was non suited .
II. Historical Background.
From a refusal, for reasons of commercial expediency, to take
cognizance of foreign revenue laws as affecting contractual obliga-
tions, the courts in England, the United States and Canada have
gone to the extent of refusing to help foreign States or provinces
collect lawfully imposed taxes .
The history and origin of the rule-if it be a rule-are not
easy to ascertain and there is on the whole remarkably little direct
authority upon the subject . One must go back to 1775 when a
resident of Dunkirk in France brought an action for the purchase
price of a quantity of tea sold and delivered to the defendant in
France which to his knowledge was to be smuggled into England .
In giving judgment for the plaintiff on the ground that mere know-
ledge of the illegal purpose of the contract did not debar him from
recovery so long as he did not participate in it, Lord Mansfield C.J.
remarked that : it
There are a great many cases which every country says shall be deter-
mined by the laws of foreign countries where they arise. But I do not
Is (1922), 23 O.W.N. 32, noted (1923), 1 Can. Bar Rev. 293 .
37 Supra, footnote 1, at p . 343 . The proper law of the contract was that
in force in Dunkirk . See also Lever v. Fletcher (1780), unreported . It is
sometimes said that in Boucher v. Lawson 1734, Cases Temp. Hardwicke
85, 95 E . R . 53, Lord Hardwicke was the first to apply the rule that "one
State will not enforce the revenue measures of another" . In this case the
plaintiff shipped gold from Portugal to England in the defendant's ship.
Under the law of Portugal, the exporting of gold was prohibited . When the
ship arrived in London, the master of the vessel refused to deliver the cargo
to the plaintiff, and the latter brought an action against the owner . The
defence interposed was that since it was illegal to export gold under the
laws of Portugal, the parties were participes criminis, and English courts
should refuse a remedy . The defense was denied on the ground that to
allow it would "cut off all benefit of such trade from this Kingdom, which
would be of very bad consequences to the principal and most beneficial
branches of our trade."
The word revenue was not used by Lord Hardwicke and thus the case
cannot be considered as first enunciating the rule . His Lordship did not
base his opinion on the nature of the invalidating foreign law but rather
on the ground that to give effect to Portuguese law would be detrimental
to British commerce. As Holdsworth pointed out in his History of English
Law (1938), Vol. II, pp . 270-271 the case is a manifestation of contem-
porary national policy .
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see how the principles on which that doctrine obtains are applicable
to the present case . For no country ever takes notice of the revenue
laws of another. 18
Four years later in Planche v. Fletcher 19 the Chief Justice repeated
his view as to the non-recognition of the revenue laws of a foreign
country. It must be emphasized here that none of these cases in-
volved a foreign power suing in an English court to recover revenue.
In Holman v . Johnson Lord Mansfield uses the words cited in con-
sidering the lex loci contractus . Stating that the courts of Dunkirk
would in no circumstances have regard to any illegality arising
under the revenue laws of another country, he then proceeded to
consider the alleged illegality under English law. In fact the basis
for the denial of the defense was harm to British commerce. The
question whether today the courts would as between the parties
enforce a contract to break the revenue laws of another country is
a separate problem that has been dealt with by the courts on
several occasions in the last fifty years.
In James v . Catherwood, 2 ° Abbott C.J ., with whom Holroyd
and Best JJ. concurred said : "This point is too plain for argument .
It has been settled, or at least considered as settled, ever since the
time of Lord Hardwicke, that in a British court we cannot take
notice of the revenue laws of a foreign State." Lord Kenyon C.J .
18 Lord Mansfield also said at p. 344 : "Is there any law of England
transgressed by a person making a complete sale of a parcel of goods at
Dunkirk, and giving credit for them? The seller indeed, knows what the
buyer is going to do with the goods but has no concern in the transaction
itself." Note that today mere knowledge of the ulterior purpose is fatal
to the action : Pearce v. Brooks (1866), L.R . 1 Ex . 213, see however Pellecatt
v. Angell (1835), 2 Cr. M. & R. 311 where Abinger C.B. said at p. 313 :
"It is . . . clear, from a long series of cases that the subject of a foreign
country is not bound to pay allegiance or respect to the revenue laws of
this ; except, indeed, that where he comes within the act of breaking them
himself. . . . But there is nothing illegal in merely knowing that the goods
he sells are to be disposed of in contravention of the fiscal laws of another
country." This case was approved by Sankey L.J . in Foster v. Driscoll,
[1929] 1 K.B. 470, at p. 518 and Scrutton L.J . at p. 498. Dicta are to be
found in James v. Catherwood (1823), 3 Dowl & Ry . 190, at p. 191 ; Sharp
v. Taylor (1849), 2 Ph . 801, at p. 816 ; Emperor of Austria v. Day (1861),
3 De G.F . & J . 217, at pp . 241-242 ; Kahler v. Midland Bank, [19501 A.C.
24, at p. 57 (H.L .) .
Note also that a number of cases involve the admissibility of documents
made in a foreign country and not stamped according to the law of that
country. In Holman v. Johnson the English revenue law was not part of
the proper law of the contract although ultimately it was to be broken .
Cf. Biggs v. Lawrence (1789), 3 Term. Rep . 454, 100 E.R . 673 ; Clugas v.
Penalenw (1791), 4 Term . Rep. 466 ; and Waymell v. Reed (1794), 5 Term.
Rep. 599, where Holmes v. Johnson was distinguished .
19 (1779), 1 Doug 251, at p. 258, 99 E.R. 164. In this case the statement
was pure obiter dictum .
zo (1823), 3 Dowl & Ry K.B . 190, at p. 191 ; see also Sharp v. Taylor
supra, footnote 18 .
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also accepted without qualification the broad rule which Lord
Mansfield had formulated .21
It was not until 1901 that the question of direct or indirect
enforcement of taxes came before the courts of the United King-
dom. The first specific decision seems to have been given by Lord
Stormonth Darling in Attorney-General for Canada v. William
Schulze CL C0 .22 The defenders had imported into Canada tweeds
which had been seized by the customs for alleged infringement of
revenue laws . On an appeal to the Exchequer Court of Canada
against the validity of the seizure, costs were awarded against the
defenders. The Attorney General for Canada sued subsequently
in the Scottish courts on the Canadian judgment for costs. Lord,
Stormonth Darling dismissed the action, saying : "It is a well-
established rule of international law that the courts of one country
will not execute or enforce the penal laws of another ; and this rule
applies not only to prosecutions and sentences for crimes and mis-
demeanors, but to all suits in favour of the State for the recovery
of pecuniary penalties for any violation of its statutes for the pro-
tection ofits revenue or other municipal laws and to all judgments
for such penalties . . . . The question between the parties was truly
whether the forfeiture was lawful, and if the defenders had suc-
ceeded, the forfeiture would have been annulled. Accordingly, the
suit was truly a revenue suit ; that is to say, in the sense of the inter-
national rule, it was a penal suit . The only question, therefore, is
whether the costs of this penal suit can be dissociated from the
suit itself as to fall outside the rule of international law"23 His
Lordship held that the costs could not be so dissociated .
In Sydney Municipal Council v. Bull," the council sued the
defendant in England for municipal improvement rates in respect
of land in Australia. The court dismissed the action saying : "Some
limit must be placed upon the available means of enforcing the
sumptuary laws enacted by foreign States for their own municipal
purposes . . . the action is in the nature of an action for a penalty
to recover a tax ; it is analogous to an action brought in one
country to enforce the revenue laws of another. In such cases it
has always been held that an action will not he outside the confines
of the last-mentioned State.""
21 Clugas v . Penaluva, supra, footnote 18 .
22 (1901), 9 S.L.T. 4 .
23 Ibid. Note that his Lordship assimilates a revenue suit to a penal suit.
For a rationale see infra, section III, footnote 49 .
24 [1909] 1 K.B . 7, 25 T.L.R. 6, 78 L.J.K.B . 45, 99 L.T. 805 .
26 Ibid., at p . 12 (K.B .) .
286
	
LA REVUE DU BARREAU CANADIEN [VOL. XLII
In re Visser, Queen of Holland v. Drukker,=6 the Dutch Govern-
ment sued in England the administrator of the estate of a Dutch
subject, who died domiciled in Holland, to recover Dutch death
duties . Tomlin J. dismissed the suit on the authority of the last-
mentioned case and said : "It seems to be plain that, at any rate
for somewhere about 200 years, since the time of Lord Hardwicke,
the judges have had present to their minds the motion, and have
repeatedly said that the courts of this country do not take notice
of revenue laws of foreign States ."'-'
While admitting that there was no actual reported English
decision on the point till 1909 he went on to say : 13 "My own opin-
ion is that there is a well-recognized rule, which has been enforced
for at least 200 years or thereabouts ; under which those courts
will not collect the taxes of foreign States for the benefit of sov-
ereigns of those foreign States ; and this is one of those actions
which those courts will not entertain."
Several dicta are also worth mentioning as they occur in cases
that are not themselves direct authorities. In Indian and General
Investment Trust Ltd. v. Borax Consolidated Ltd. Sankey J. stated :
"Whilst it is the duty of an English court to enforce an English
Taxing Act, it is no part of its duty to enforce the Taxing Act of
another country."" Lord Moulton, delivering the judgment of the
Privy Council in Cotton v. Rex 2l said : "There is no accepted prin-
ciple in international law to the effect that nations should recognize
or enforce the fiscal laws of foreign countries."
More recently Peter Buchanan Ltd. & Machary v . 1tlcVey," a
case decided by Kingsmill Moore J. of the High Court of Justice
of Eire which was affirmed on appeal by the Supreme Court of
26 [1928] Ch . 877, 97 L. J . Ch. 488, 44 T.L.R . 692, 139 L.T . 658, noted
(1928), 6 Can . Bar Rev . 631 .
27 1hid., at p . 884 (Ch .) . The words "take notice" if applied without
discrimination could lead to a too wide an application of the rule, as there
are cases in which the courts, although they do not enforce foreign revenue
laws, are bound to recognize some of their effects.
28 Ibid., at p . 884 .
28 [1920] 1 K.B . 539, at p. 550, 36 T.L.R . 125,122 L.T . 547, 89 L.J.K.B .
252 .
ao [1914] A.C . 176, at p. 195, 15 D.L.R . 283, at p . 293 . See also Receiver
General of New Brunswick v . Rosborough (1915), 24 D.L.R. 354, at p . 364
(N.B . S.C .) ; The Eva, [19211 P. 454. In re Cohen, [1945] Ch . 5, Evershed
M. R . said : "As is well known, it is not the practice of civilized countries,
such as France and England, to enforce the revenue laws of the other of
them" and in King of the Hellenes v . Bostrom (1923), 16 Ll . L. Rep . 190,
at p. 193 one finds a statement of Rowlatt J . to the effect that "It is per-
fectly elementary that a foreign government cannot come here, nor will
the courts of other countries allow our Government to go there and sue
a person found in that jurisdiction for taxes levied and which he is de-
clared to be liable to in the country to which he belongs."
a' [19551 A.C. 516, noted Donaldson, (1954), 3 Int . & Comp . L.Q. 161 .
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Eire, made it clear that although there may be circumstances in
which the courts will have regard to the revenue laws of another
country, in no instance will they directly or indirectly enforce
such revenue laws.
The Buchanan Company was a company registered in Scotland
which had been put in liquidation by the revenue authorities in
Scotland under a compulsory winding up order in respect of a very
large claim for excess profits tax and income tax. The defendant
held ninety-nine shares of the capital of the company and the
remaining share was held by another person as trustee for him.
These two sole shareholders were also sole directors . The defen-
dant having realized the whole assets of the company in his capacity
as a director and having satisfied substantially the whole of the
company indebtedness, other than that due to the revenue, had the
balance transferred to himself to his credit with an Irish bank and
decamped to Ireland. The liquidator then sued the defendant in
Ireland on the ground of his breach of trust in taking this balance
from the company. The defendant contended that as he had re-
ceived the money from the company in his capacity as a share-
holder in pursuance of an agreement between all the corporators,
the company could not now ask to have it back . Kingsmill Moore
J. held that the transaction was a dishonest transaction designed
to defeat the claim of the revenue in Scotland as a creditor and
was ultra vires the company and accordingly rejected the defen-
dant's submission. On the other hand, he held that although the
action was in form an action by the company to recover these
assets it was in substance an attempt to enforce indirectly a claim
to tax by the revenue authorities of another State. He accordingly
dismissed the action . Thejudge considered the effect of the various
decisions cited above and said : 11
These decisions establish that the courts of our country will not en-
force the revenue claims of a foreign country in a suit brought for the
purpose by a foreign public authority or the representative of such an
authority, and that, even if a judgment for a foreign penalty or debt
be obtained in the country in which it is incurred, it is not possible
successfully to sue in this country on such judgment . They do not
expressly go further, though some of the dicta suggest,that there may
be a principle that our courts will not lend themselves indirectly to the
collection of a foreign tax and will not entertain a suit which is brought
for that object. Such a wide extension is also suggested by the author-
ities which establish that our courts will not entertain an action for the
enforcement of a penalty imposed by the laws of a foreign State, a
12 Ibid., at pp . 526-530 .
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principle which seems to have been the parent of the rule as to not
enforcing foreign revenue claims . . . .
Those cases on penalties would seem to establish that it is not the form
of the action or the nature of the plaintiff that must be considered, but
the substance of the right sought to be enforced ; and that if the en-
forcement of such right would even indirectly involve the execution of
the penal law of another State, then the claim must be refused . I can-
not see why the same rule should not prevail where it appears that the
enforcement of the right claimed would indirectly involve the execu-
tion of the revenue law of another State, and serve a revenue demand. . . .
In deciding cases between private persons in which there is present
such a foreign element as would ordinarily induce the application of
the principles of a foreign law, courts have always exercised the right
to reject such law on the ground that it conflicted with public policy
or affronted the accepted morality of the domestic forum . Contracts
valid according to what would normally be considered "the proper
law" of the contract will not be enforced if in the view of the court
they are tainted with immorality of one kind and another. Delicts
committed abroad are not actionable here unless they are torts by our
law . Slavery, or any other status involving penal or private disabilities,
is not recognized . If, then, in disputes between private citizens, it has
been considered necessary to reserve an option to reject foreign law
as incompatible with the views of the community, it must have been
equally, if not more, necessary to reserve a similar option where an
attempt was made to enforce the governmental claims (including
revenue claims) of a foreign State . But if the courts had contented
themselves with an option to refuse such claims, instead of imposing
a general rule of exclusion, the task of formulating and applying the
principles of selection would have been one not only of difficulty but
danger, involving inevitably an incursion into political fields with grave
risks of embarrassing the executive in its foreign relations and even of
provoking international complication . Neither common morality nor
"settled public policy" would have sufficed to cover the area of neces-
sary rejection ; for the nature and incidence of governmental and
revenue claims are not dictated by any moral principles but are the
offspring of political considerations and political necessity. Taxation
originally expressed only the will of the despot, enforceable by torture,
slavery and death . Though it may be conceded that in modern times
it is more often designed to further a benevolent social policy, and
that the civil servant has usurped the position of the executioner as
the agent of enforcement, yet in essence taxation is still arbitrary and
depends for its effectiveness only on the executive power of the State.
Nor is modern history without examples of revenue laws used for pur-
poses which would not only affront the strongest feelings of neighbour-
ing communities but would run counter to their political aims and
vital interests . Such laws have been used for religious and racial dis-
criminations, for the furtherance of social policies and ideals dangerous
to the security of adjacent countries, and for the direct furtherance of
economic warfare. So long as these possibilities exist it would be
equally unwise for the courts to permit the enforcement of the revenue
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claims of foreign States or to attempt to discriminate between those
claims which they would and those which they would not enforce.
Safety lies only in universal rejection . Such a principle appears to me
to be fundamental and of supreme importance .
If Ii am right in attributing such importance to the principle, then it is
clear that its enforcement must not depend merely on the form in
which the claim is made . It is not a question whether the plaintiff is a
foreign State or the representative of a foreign State or its revenue
authority. In every case the substance of the claim must be scrutinized,
and if it then appears that it is really â suit brought for the purpose of
collecting the debts of a foreign revenue it must be rejected . Mr. Wilson
has pressed upon me the difficulty of deciding such a question of fact
and has relied on "ratio ruentis acervi" . For the purpose of this case
it is sufficient to say that when it appears to the court that the whole
object of the suit is to collect tax for a foreign revenue, and that this
will be the sole result of a decision in favour of the plaintiff, then a
court is entitled to reject the claim by refusing jurisdiction .
This case was approved by Lord Keith of Avonholm in Govern-
ment of India, Ministry of Finance (Revenue Division) v. Taylor.33
The issue was whether a foreign government's claim for unpaid
taxes is a provable debt in an English liquidation . The Delhi
Electric Supply and Traction Co . Ltd., a company registered in
England but carrying on business in India, sold its business to the
Indian Government for a sum of money which was remitted to
England as soon as received . After the company had gone into
voluntary liquidation, the Government of India sought to prove
for a sum due in respect of Indian income tax including capital
gains tax derived from the sale of the business . The claim was re-
jected by the liquidator, and his decision was upheld by Vaisey 3.,
the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords. Their Lordships were
unanimous in holding that claims ôn behalf of a foreign State to
recover taxes dueunder its laws are unenforceable in English courts
and that there is no valid distinction for this purpose between
foreign States and States adhering to the British Commonwealth .
Lord Mansfield's rule has also been recognized by Parliament
on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. In the United Kingdom the
Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act, 1933, excludes
from the advantages of the Act a judgment for "a sum payable in
respect of taxes or other charges of a like nature or in respect of a
fine or other penalty".34
In Canada, the Uniform Foreign Judgments Act as approved
by the Conference of Commissioners on Uniformity of Legisla-
33 Supra, footnote 15, at p . 510 . See Comment by Mann, Foreign
Revenue Laws and the English Conflict of Laws (1954), 3 Int. & Comp.
L.Q . 465 and (1955), 4 Int . & Comp . L.Q . 564.
3123 Geo. 5, c . 13, s . 1 (2) (b) .
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tion in Canada in August 1933, states that "where an action is
brought in this province upon a foreign judgment, it shall be a
sufficient defence, that the judgment is for the payment of a pen-
alty or a sum of money due under the revenue laws of the foreign
country"."
English precedents have been followed in the United States
of America . In an early case involving the enforceability in New
York of a promissory note made in France, allegedly invalid
because of noncompliance with a French stamp requirement, the
court said it was not required to take notice of French revenue
laws . 36 In 1843 Parker C.J. when giving judgment in Henry v.
Sargeant" said obiter that one of the American States will not en-
force the revenue laws of another . There was no direct adjudication
until 1911 when in State of Maryland v. Turner" the court refused
to entertain an action in New York by the State of Maryland to
recover personal property taxes assessed on the defendant while
he was resident of Maryland . This case was followed by Colorado
v. Harbeck as in which the deceased was domiciled in Colorado
but all his property was in New York. He died en route to Europe.
After the will had been admitted to probate and taxes paid in New
York and the property distributed, the State of Colorado instituted
assessment proceedings in Colorado to compute the tax on the in-
tangible personal property of the deceased . Notice by mail was
given of the assessment and then Colorado began a suit in New
York against the legatees, executrix and trustees under the will
(none of whom were resident in Colorado) to recover the inherit-
ance tax supposedly due to Colorado. The complaint was dis-
missed .
In City ofDetroit v . Proctor,"the Delaware court also dismissed
an action brought by the City of Detroit to enforce personal prop-
erty taxes against a resident of Michigan. On the other hand the
rule was disregarded in a few cases such as Holhouser Co . v. Gold
Hill Copper Co." where North Carolina abandoned precedent to
3e S . 6 (f), (1933), 18 Proc . of Can. Bar Assoc. 310 ; see also An Act to
Facilitate the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments, 1958, [1958] Pro-
ceedings of 40th Annual Meeting of Conference of Commissioners on
Uniformity of Legislation in Canada 90, ss . 2(1) (a), 3 (6) (f) and (g) .
ss Ludlow et al v . Van Rensselaer (1806),1 Johns Sup . Ct . Rep . (3 N.Y.) 94.
31 (1843), 13 N.H . 321, at p . 332 .
as (1911), 75 Misc. 9, 132 N.Y . Supp . 173 (Sup . Ct.), noted (1912),
12 Col . L . Rev . 60 .as (1921), 232 N.Y. 71, 133 N.E. 357 . See also in re Bliss (1923), 121
Misc . 773, 202 N.Y . Supp. 185 ; in re Martin Estate (1930), 136 Misc. 51,
240 N.Y.S . 393 ; Moore v . Mitchell (1929), 30 F . 2d . 600 .
40 (1948), 61 A 2d 412, noted (1949), 47 Mich . L . Rev. 796.
41 (1905), 138 N.C . 248, 50 S.E . 650, 70 L.R.A . 183 .
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the extent of permitting New Jersey to prove a tax claim in an
insolvency proceeding. The court may have considered the doctrine
not to have been involved, for the opinion did not mention it.
In Milwaukee County v. M E. White & Co. 42 a municipal cor-
poration in Wisconsin assessed taxes against an Illinois corpora-
tion for income earned in Wisconsin. Judgment was recovered in
Wisconsin on the assessment . When satisfaction could not be
obtained action was brought on this judgment in a federal court in
Illinois. The suit was dismissed on the ground that it was brought
to enforce arevenue law of Wisconsin. The Court of Appeals certi-
fied to the United States Supreme Court the question whether a
federal district court in Illinois should entertain the action. The
Supreme Court held that it should and that by virtue of section
1 of article IV of the American Constitution one State must give
full faith and credit to another State's judgment for taxes. In do-
ing so the second State is not required to go into the relationship be-
tween the first State and its citizens as that has already been decid-
ed . The court said : "The objection that the courts in one State will
not entertain suit to recover taxes due to another or upon a judg-
ment for such taxes, is not rightly addressed to any want ofjudicial
power in courts which are authorized to entertain civil suits at law.
It goes not to the jurisdiction but to the merits; and raises a ques-
tion which district courts are competent to decide' 1.41 The Supreme
Court left open the question of enforceability of mere tax assess-
ments of sister States . The inference from the above language would
be that enforcement is to be granted unless the case involves
peculiar tax claims clearly contrary to the public policy of the
forum.
Although a revenue judgment does not change the nature of
the obligation, the full faith and credit clause compels such a
result . If the tax is collectible after being reduced to judgment,
there is no reason it should not be collectible before taking the
form of ajudgment . The Milwaukee County case was not followed
in Government ofIndia v. Taylor where Lord Simonds said : 44
I am ever willing to get help from seeing how the law which is our
common heritage, has developed on the other side of the Atlantic,
but a development which is not universal, and is in any case confined
to relations between State and State within the Union can have no
weight in determining what the law is in this country .
MacLean J. in United States of America v. Harden also pointed
42 (1935), 296 U.S . 268, 56 S . Ct. 229, 80 L . Ed. 220, noted (1935), 84
U . of Pa . L . Rev . 526 .
43 Ibid., at p . 272 . 44 Supra, footnote 15, at p . 507 .
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out that the case was based upon considerations of constitutional
law peculiar to the United States of America.45
In the more recent case of State ex rel Oklahoma Tax Commis-
sion v. Rodgers'46 the State of Oklahoma brought a suit in Missouri
against a former resident for unpaid income taxes. Upon review,
the St . Louis Court of Appeals, after a detailed examination ofthe
rule, rejected it as inapplicable to claims of sister States . The court
decided that a tax is of a quasi contractual nature and that its en-
forcement contravenes no policy of the forum. Simple principles
of comity and justice require Missouri to take notice of the
Oklahoma statutes . A similar approach was adopted by the Su-
preme Court of Arkansas in State of Oklahoma ex rel Oklahoma
Tax Commission v. Neeley.47 George Rose Smith A.J . said : 18 "In
our opinion the oft-repeated dogma, that one sovereign does not
enforce the revenue laws of another is rapidly approaching a de-
served extinction in these instances in which the dispute is not
international but merely interstate".
From the foregoing historical survey, it may be concluded that
in the Anglo-American legal system, the rule against the enforce-
ment of tax laws rests largely on judicial tradition as applied to
situations far beyond the probable anticipation of Lord Mansfield.
Although supported by precedent, it is precedent that arose from
a misapplication of the doctrine as originally developed . In spite
of the attempts that have been made to rationalize the rule its
application remains an excellent illustration of the evils of mech-
anical jurisprudence. It is the duty of the courts to re examine the
foundations of rules that no longer correspond to modern condi-
tions . The courts have merely repeated the time-worn axiom,
without considering whether the reasons that made it desirable
to apply in the early cases are still valid today. A rule is never so
well established as to preclude inquiry into its justification or to
preclude its abandonment if justice is promoted by so doing.
III. Legal Foundation for the Rule .
Although historically tax laws have been assimilated to penal laws,
they are in fact difficult to classify . Tax claims should be considered
civil as to the tax and criminal as to any penalty for non payment
or late payment of the tax. Broadly speaking they are government
claims for which no conflict rules exist.
45 Supra, footnote 5, at p . 570 .
46 (1946), 238 Mo App . 1115, 193 S.W . 2d 919, noted (1946), 41 111 . L .
Rev. 439, (1946), 25 Tex . L . Rev . 88 ; State of Ohio ex re Duffy v . Arnett
(1950), 314 Ky 403, 234 S .W. 2d 722.
47 (1955), 282 S .W. 2d 150 . 48 1bid., at p . 151 .
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A survey of the cases indicates that a revenue law is one im-
posing a non contractual involuntary monetary imposition in
favour of the State or some department or subdivision thereof.
Characterization is generally given by the lex for!. Revenue laws
embrace income taxes, custom duties, stamp duties, succession
duties, capital gain taxes, profit taxes, municipal taxes.
Various arguments have been advanced in support of the an-
cient rule. As pointed out above it has been maintained that a
revenue law and a penal law are similar in the sense that they are
both governmental regulations of a civic duty. The right under
each accrues in favour of the State without the consent of the
citizen involved and it is a well-established principle of law univer-
sally admitted that the courts of one State will not enforce the
penal laws of another . 49 There are however basic differences be-
tween a penal and a revenue law. A penal law is one that imposes
an obligation as a punishment for a designated act or omission to
act without regard to residence, ownership of property or amount
of income whereas a tax law defines the extent of the citizen's
pecuniary obligation to the government and provides a means for
its collection without regard to the commission of a wrong. The
purpose 'of tax laws is to enable the State to provide essential
public and welfare services for its citizens . Furthermore, where a
breach of criminal law occurs, the aggrieved State may have re-
course to extradition proceedings . This remedy is not available
with respect to tax claims .
Although it could be argued that a person living in a State or
doing business there impliedly consents to pay lawful taxes as a
matter of law, the courts have rejected the view that a tax is in the
nature of a contractual obligation and hence a transitory cause of
action that may be sued upon in any foreign jurisdiction . In
State of Colorado v. Ilarbeck, 59 Pound J. stated : "no contractual
or quasi contractual obligation to pay arises out of the assessment
of a tax. . . . The enforcement of revenue laws rests, not on con-
sent, but on force and authority" . .
In his speech in Government of India, Ministry of Finance
(Revenue Division) v. Taylor," Lord Keith of Avonholm suggested
two explanations for the rule that in no circumstances will the
courts directly or indirectly enforce the revenue laws of another
country
as Huntington v . Attrill, supra, footnote 11 . See also Le$ar, Extrastate En-
forcement of Penal and Governmental Claims (1932), 46 Harv. L . Rev. 193 .e° Supra, footnote 39, at p . 82 (N.Y .) .
51 Supra, footnote 15, at p . 511 .
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One explanation of the rule thus illustrated may be thought to be that
enforcement of a claim for taxes is but an extension of the sovereign
power which imposed the taxes, and that an assertion of sovereign
authority by one State within the territory of another, as distinct from
a patrimonial claim by a foreign sovereign, is (treaty or convention
apart) contrary to all concepts of independent sovereignties. Another
explanation has been given by an eminent American judge, Judge
Learned Hand, in the case of Moore v. Mitchell (1929), 30 F 2d 600,
604, in a passage, quoted also by Kingsmill Moore J. in the case of
Peter Buchanan Ltd. and Machary v. McVey, [1955] A.C. 516 as
follows : "While the origin of the exception in the case of penal liabil-
ities does not appear in the books, a sound basis for it exists, in my
judgment, which includes liabilities for taxes as well . Even in the case
of ordinary municipal liabilities, a court will not recognize those aris-
ing in a foreign State, if they run counter to the `settled public policy'
of its own . Thus a scrutiny of the liability is necessarily always in
reserve, and the possibility that it will be found not to accord with the
policy of the domestic State. This is not a troublesome or delicate
inquiry when the question arises between private persons, but it takes
on quite another face when it concerns the relations between the fo-
reign State and its own citizens or even those who may be temporarily
within its borders . To pass upon the provisions for the public order
of another State is, or at any rate should be, beyond the powers of the
court ; it involves the relations between the States themselves, with
which courts are incompetent to deal, and which are intrusted to other
authorities . It may commit the domestic State to a position which
would seriously embarrass its neighbour. Revenue laws fall within
the same reasoning ; they affect a State in matters as vital to its exis-
tence as its criminal laws . No court ought to undertake an inquiry
which it cannot prosecute without determining whether those laws
are consonant with its own notions of what is proper" .
On either of the explanations which I have just stated I find a solid
basis of principle for a rule which has long been recognized and which
has been applied by a consistent train of decisions . It may be possible
to find reasons for modifying the rule as between States of a federal
union . But that consideration, in my opinion, has no relevance to this
case .
And in United States of America v. Harden 52 Cartwright J. relying
upon the same case said :
The views (i) That the application of the rule that foreign States can-
not directly or indirectly enforce their tax claims in our courts is not
affected by the taking of a judgment in the foreign State ; and (ii) That
the liability to pay tax does not become converted into a contractual
obligation, both appear to me to be supported by the following passage
in the speech of Lord Somervell of Harrow in Government of India,
Ministry of Finance v . Taylor, [1955] A.C. at pp . 514 and 515 :
"If one State could collect its taxes through the courts of another,
it would have arisen through what is described, vaguely perhaps,
62 Supra, footnote 2, at p. 635 (W.W.R.).
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as comity or the general practice of nations inter se . The appellant
was therefore in a difficulty from the outset in that after consider-
able research no case of any country could be found in which taxes
due to State A had been enforced in the courts of State B . Apart
from the comparatively recent English, Scotch and Irish cases there
is no authority. There are, however, many propositions for which
no express authority can be found because they have been regarded
as self-evident to all concerned . There must have been many
potential defendants .
Tax gathering is an administrative act, though in settling the
quantum as well as in the final act of collection judicial process
may be involved. Our courts will apply foreign law if it is the
proper law of a contract, the subject of a suit . Tax gathering is not
a matter of contract but of authority and administration as between
the State and those within its jurisdiction. If one considers the
initial stages of the process, . which may, as the records of your
Lordships' House show, be intricate and prolonged, it would be
remarkable comity if State B allowed the time of its courts to be
expended in assisting in this regard the tax gatherers of State A .
Once a judgment has been obtained and it is a question only ofits
enforcement the factor of time and expense will normally have
disappeared. The principle remains . The claim is one for a tax.
That fact, I think, itself justifies what has been clearly the practice
of States . They have not in the past thought it appropriate to seek
to use legal process abroad against debtor taxpayers. They assumed,
rightly, that the courts would object to being so used . The position
in the United States of America has been referred to, and I agree
that the position as between member States - of a federation, wher-
ever the reserve of sovereignty may be, does not help" . 51
Thus, revenue laws, as an extension of the sovereign power, are
deemed to be strictly territorial in their nature and application .
They have no effect outside the jurisdiction that enacted them and
therefore it is not necessary to devise conflict rules to deal with the
recognition and enforcement of foreign tax laws or judgments. It
is a fact, however, that there are many foreign territorial laws that
are recognized or applied in our courts every day.
In the ordinary conflict of laws situation it is well established
that a foreign law normally applicable that conflicts with local
public policy must be set aside. If the recovery of a foreign revenue
debt were allowed, the courts would of necessity be forced to con-
sa Lord Somervell of Harrow also cited a passage written by Pillet,
Traité de droit international privé (1924), para . 674, where the author
declares : "Les jugements rendus en matière criminelle ne sont pas les
seuls qui soient soumis à la loi de la territorialité absolue . Les jugements
rendus en matière fiscale ne sont eux non plus suceptibles d'aucune exécu-
tion à l'étranger et l'on n'a même jamais songé à la possibilité de faire
exécuter sur le territoire de l'un d'eux une sentence relative aux droits
fiscaux de l'État qui aurait été rendue sur le territoire d'un autre?" See also
Rliboyet, Traité de droit international privé français, vol . VI-(1949), p . 15 .
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sider whether the foreign policy leading to the creation of the debt
offended the local public policy . Since an inquiry into the com-
plexities of the foreign revenue system and the relations of the
State imposing the tax to its citizens is delicate and might cause
political embarrassment it is better ro refuse to enforce all revenue
claims . This rationalization by Judge Learned Hand is not very
helpful. All statutes to some degree reflect the public order of the
State that enacted them and in most conflict of laws cases the
forum applies foreign statutes .
The possibility of holding that a given foreign tax statute is
invalid, or not applicable to the thing or person to be taxed, is just
as offensive to the taxing State as a flat refusal to permit any action
at all, thus affording sanctuary to delinquent tax payers . The fact
that local courts might be unfamiliar with the technicalities of
foreign revenue laws is no more an obstacle to their enforcement
than in the ordinary conflict case where some other foreign law is
applicable." Jurisdiction should be refused only in those cases
where some real obstacle to enforcement is present. Mere difficulty
in applying the law is not a sufficient reason for refusing to deal
with a situation where the taxing State has no remedy in its own
courts due to its inability to secure jurisdiction over a non-resident
taxpayer . Of course, the foreign State being responsible for bring-
ing the action must accept the forum's interpretation and cannot
be heard to complain if it loses the case. Why should the forum be
more embarrassed when it renders a judgment in favour of the
defendant in the case of a tax claim than where any other claim is
brought by a foreign sovereign? The often repeated justification,
that of one sovereign's reluctance to inquire into another's system
of law or to risk affront by the denial of a sovereign's demand,
obviously does not apply in litigation originating in and confined
to Canada. As far as the inconvenience to the defendant in being
compelled to conduct his defence outside the jurisdiction where
the acts giving rise to the claim for taxes took place, and the diffi-
culty of proving facts at a distance from the place of their origin
are concerned, it is sufficient to remark that he will usually have
brought these upon himself by removing his person or property
from the taxing State. Such practical inconveniences are common
to all transitory civil actions and have never been considered as a
54 For instance, Professor Beale, in Conflict of Laws, vol. 3 (1935),
p . 1638 suggests that the forum "may well feel very reluctant to assume the
burden of administering an intricate tax system with which it is totally
unacquainted, especially in view of the crowded dockets which are to be
found almost everywhere" .
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reason to bar them . Why should a different rule obtain in a tax
action than in any other civil action? If it should appear however
that relief could be obtained in the foreign State, the enforcing
court would perhaps be justified in applying the doctrine offorum
non conveniens to exclude the action .
There is no doubt that some types of foreign taxes must be
disregarded when they are discriminatory or contrary to the strong
public policy of the forum, but the possibility of rejection in some
cases should notbe urged in favour oftotal disregard of all revenue
laws . As between the Canadian provinces where tax laws are fairly
well standardized there is no reason to invoke public policy as a
bar to their recognition and enforcement. The Province of Ontario
has no local public policy opposed to the imposition of an income,
succession or sales tax that would prompt its courts to refuse en-
forcement of a similar Quebec tax. Public policy is a defence to be
invoked only in extreme cases where the basis for taxation is un-
just and completely foreign to local concepts, otherwise to deny
recognition and enforcement of foreign tax laws would seem to
imply that the levying oftaxes is fundamentally unjust, aconclusion
entirely at variance with modern concepts of taxation.
Why not consider, as the St. Louis Court of Appeals did in
State ofOklahoma v. Rodgers, that a tax claim is quasi contractual
in nature and apply the ordinary conflict rules in that area to its
enforcement? If the claim brought by a foreign State is quasi
contractual there seems to be no logical justification for making a
distinction between private claims and those made by a foreign
State. The same conflict rules of the forum will govern both.55
Another approach is, to devise a set of conflict rules designed
to deal specifically with the recognition and enforcement of foreign
taxes without attempting to assimilate tax claims to contractual
or quasi contractual claims. Once avalid tax claim is created by vir-
tue of the taxing statute of Ontario, the Government of the Province
should be able to enforce it against the taxpayer wherever he goes.
There is no fundamental objection to holding that Quebec may
impose upon the delinquent taxpayer a duty to pay the taxes levied
under the laws of Ontario. It could be argued however that in
some jurisdictions the statutory method of collecting taxes is an
exclusive territorial remedy and short of an express or implied
51 Supra, footnote 46 . In Milwaukee County v . M. E. White Co.,
supra, footnote 42, Mr . Justice Stone said : " . . . still the obligation to pay
taxes is not penal . It is a statutory liability, quasi contractual in nature,
enforceable if there is no exclusive statutory remedy, in the civil courts
by the common-law action of debt or indebitatus assumpsit."
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legislative intent no common-law action is available. Consequent-
ly when the courts of one jurisdiction are asked to enforce the
tax laws of another, they may well hold that no method for col-
lecting the taxes in another State is provided for in the statutes
of the taxing State; or should a common-law action have been
available, this may be construed as confined also to the courts of
the taxing State . It seems that methods of enforcement must be
characterized as procedural matters governed exclusively by the
lexfori. When the right to bring an action under the taxing statute
or at common law is given to the collecting agency of the State that
imposed the tax, the extraterritorial enforcement of such claim
should be governed by the law of the enforcing State. A tax claim,
unlike a penalty, is transitory and not local. One should be able
to sue upon it in any court having jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant regardless of where the facts creating the cause of
action chance to occur. In most countries the form of the tax col-
lecting action will be the customary suit for a money judgment
directed against a person or a res. Whatever the remedy available
in the enforcing State for the collection of local taxes it should
also be used in the case of foreign taxes.
In re Bliss," the New York court maintained that allowing
collection of foreign taxes is a matter which "far exceeds any
question of comity and would create a system whereby each State
would become the busy collection agent of another State in gather-
ing its taxes" . In this case the court failed however to explain why
it believed the abrogation of the revenue rule would force each
State to become a "busy collection agent" and why in any event
aiding in the collection of other States' taxes is such an intolerable
burden . Experience shows that in States that have allowed suits
for the recovery of foreign taxes the courts have not been over-
burdened with added expenses . Furthermore the net cost of such
suits to the enforcing State could be charged entirely to the losing
party.
It must be noted that despite the wide terminology of Lord
Mansfield's formula the courts from early times have not followed
it to the full extent of its meaning in the contractual field . In Alves
v. Hodgson," it was recognized that a contract that was void in
the foreign country where it was made by reason of the absence of
a stamp would be treated as void by the English courts even though
the requirements of a stamp was a foreign revenue provision . In
ss Supra, footnote 39, at p . 777 (Misc .) .
er (1797), 7 Term Rep . 241, 101 E.R . 953 ; Also Clegg v . Levy (1812),
3 Camp . 166 ; Bristow v. Sequeville (1850), 5 Ex. 275, 155 E.R . 118 .
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other words, there are certain cases in which, although the courts
do not enforce the foreign revenue law involved, they are bound
to recognize some of the consequences of that law. It can be ser-
iously doubted whether Lord Mansfield intended his remarks to
preclude a court from informing itself as to the provisions of a
revenue law of a foreign country in order to determine the question
whether a foreign transaction was or was not fraudulent and void
according to the law of that country."
Lord Mansfield's pronouncement has also been subject to
criticism by judges and textbook writers." Sankey L.J., in Foster
v . Driscoll" clearly considered the statement too wide, and in
Ralli Brothers v. Compania Naviera Sota y 4znar," Scrutton L.J.
reserved the right to consider it in view of the obligation of inter-
national comity as it is now understood. In the House of Lords,
Viscount Simonds in Regazzoni v. K.C. Sethia Ltd. said : "It does
not follow from the fact that today the court will not enforce a
revenue law at the suit of a foreign State that today it will enforce
a contract which requires the doing of an act in a foreign country
which violates the revenue laws of that country. . . . It is sufficient,
however, for the purposes of the present appeal to say that, whether
or not an exception must still be made in regard to the breach of
a revenue law in deference to old authority there is no ground for
making an exception in regard to any other law." Lord Keith also
remarked that : "I agree with the view entertained by some of your
Lordships and by all the Lords Justices in the Court of Appeal
that the proposition that `no country ever takes notice of the
revenue laws of another' is too widely expressed." 62 As the editors
of Dicey point out : "It is therefore conceived that the old author-
ities would not now be followed ; and that a contract which vio-
lated (e .g .) the customs regulations of either the proper law or poss-
ibly the lex loci solutions would be treated as invalid in England.""
es See Republica de Guatemala v . Nunez, [1927] 1 K.B . 669, at p . 691 .
ss Anson, Law of Contracts (21st ed., 1959), pp . 293-295 ; Dicey,
Conflict of Laws (6th ed ., 1958), p . 607 and rule 21, p . 161 .
60 Supra, footnote 18, at p . 516 et seq .
61 [1920] 2 K.B . 287, at p . 300 . See also Evershed M.R . in Kahler v.
Midland Bank, [1948] 1 All E.R . 811, at p . 819 (C.A .) ; Re Delhi Electric
Supply and Traction Co. Ltd., [1954] Ch . 131, at p . 151 and Lord Simonds
in the same case in the House of Lords, sub nom Government of India v.
Taylor, supra, footnote 15, at p . 505 ; Denning and Parker L.J .J . in Regaz-
zoni v . K. C. Sethia (1944) Ltd., [1956] 2 Q.B . 490, at pp . 515, 524, [1956]
1 All E.R . 229, aff'd [1956] 2 All E.R. 487 (C.A .), at pp . 490, 496, aff'd
[1957] 3 W.L.R . 752, [1957] 3 All E.R . 286 (H.L.) ; Falconbridge, Essays
on the Conflict of Laws (2nd ed ., 1954), p . 385 et . seq.
62 Ibid., at pp . 760 and 765 (W.L.R.) .
sa Op. cit., footnote 59, rule 21 and Regazzoni v. K. C. Sethia (1944)
Ltd., ibid.
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In Canada, however, the old English cases seem to have been
followed. Where a contract of sale was completed aboard, it
was held that an action upon it will be upheld though one of the
parties to the knowledge of the other intended to violate the laws
of Canada . Recovery is barred only where the seller knew of the
fraudulent intention of the buyer and also participated in the
fraud."
In Reid v . Diebel" the plaintiff sued to cancel a contract for the
purchase of stock-in-trade and to recover a cash deposit on the
main ground that the defendant had permitted persons in his em-
ployment to smuggle goods from his store into the United States
in violation of the revenue laws of that country. The court held that
contracts having for their object the violation of these laws may
be enforced in Ontario." Actually there is no logical justification
for the indiscriminate exclusion of all categories of foreign revenue
laws .
As Lord Denning pointed out in Regazzoni v . K.C. Sethia
(1944) Ltd." : "It seems to me that we should take notice of the
laws of a friendly country, even if there are revenue laws or penal
laws or political laws, however they may be described, at least to
this extent that, if two people knowingly agree together to break
the laws of a friendly country or to procure someone else to break
them or to assist in the doing of it, then they cannot ask this court
to give its aid to the enforcement of their agreement."
This was also Parker L.J .'s opinion in the same case" when he
said : "I do not see why in principle this court should not also
inform itself of the provisions of a penal or revenue law in order
to see whether or not the parties to an English contract had in
effect agreed to break that law." For instance an Ontario contract
the object of which is to infringe the revenue laws of a friendly
power should be void as contrary to the local public policy since
otherwise as Lawrence L.J . pointed out in Foster v. Driscoll : s9
11 Johnson, Conflict of Laws (2nd ed ., 1962), p . 599 ; Leboeerfv . Lavallée
(1898), 15 S.C. 520, (1899), 5 R . de J. 382 obiter, where the Court of Review
cited Holman v . Johnson, supra, footnote 1, Biggs v. Lau,rence, supra,
footnote 18, Hodgson v . Temple (1813), 5 Taunt 181 and Pellecatt v. Angell,
supra, footnote 18 .
s' (1409), 14 O.W.R . 77 .es See also Walkerville Brewing Co . v . Mayrand (1928), 63 O.L.R . 5,
[1928] 4 D.L.R . 500, rev'd (1929), 63 O.L.R . 573, 2 D.L.R . 945 to be com-
pared to Foster v . Driscoll, supra, footnote 18, Biggs v. Lawrence, supra,
footnote 18, and Harwood & Cooper v . Wilkinson (1929), 64 O.L.R . 392,
[1929] 4 D.L.R . 734, rev'd (1929), 64 O.L.R . 658, [19301 2 D.L.R . 199,
conf . [19311 S.C.R . 141, [1931] 2 D.L.R . 479 and Westgate v . Harris,
f192914 D.L.R . 643, 64 O.L.R . 358 (C.A .).
67 [1956] 2 All E.R . 487, at p . 490 .
11 Ibid., at p. 496.
69
Supra, footnote 18, at p . 510.
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"Recognition by our courts [of such agreements] would furnish
a just cause for complaint by the [foreign] Government against our
Government . . . and would be contrary to our obligations of inter-
national comity as now understood and recognized and therefore
would offend against our notions of public morality."
In sum no adequate justification has been offered for refusing
to enforce foreign tax laws directly or indirectly . The solution lies
either in devising adequate conflict of laws rules for this purpose,
using public policy as a safety valve in extreme cases or, in adopting
statutes providing for instance that :
Any Province of Canada [or foreign State] or any political subdivision
thereof shall have the right to sue in the courts [of Ontario] to recover
any lawful tax that may be owing to it when the like right is ac-
corded to the province [of Ontario] and its political subdivisions by
such Province [or foreign State], whether such right is granted by
statutory authority or as a matter of comity .
Modern conditions demand the availability of extraterritorial
techniques of tax collection especially as between the provinces of
Canada. The rule enunciated,by Lord Mansfield was the product
of an era of fierce commercial nationalism that has no place in a
Union of provinces such as Canada. It should not be used to en-
courage wilful and dishonest tax evasion. There is also little justi-
fication for treating differently tax assessments matured into court
judgments and those merely imposed by the administrative au-
thorities, provided the imposition is final.71)
IV. New Trends in Quebec.
Last year the Quebec Legislature made a progressive move when
it added the following paragraph to article 79 of the Code of Civil
Procedure : 11
The courts in the Province shall recognize and enforce the obligations
resulting from the taxation laws of another Canadian Province in
which the obligations resulting from the taxation laws of the Province
are recognized and enforced .
Theexplanatory notes to the bill state that the object ofthis amend-
ment is to permit the recovery of taxes due by persons who do not
reside in the taxing province and have no property there. For such
purpose, a right of action before Quebec courts is given to any
other Canadian province that grants the same right to the Province
of Quebec. The action must be brought by the sister province in
its own name. This reform has a direct utilitarian purpose and must
70 See Ehrenzweig, Conflict of Laws (1962), pp . 170, 174,
71 S.Q,, 1963, c. 63 .
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be read in connection with An Act to Amend the Provincial In-
come Tax Act" which provides in section 3 that :
A tax shall be paid as hereinafter required for each taxation year, upon
his taxable income by
a) every person resident in the province on the last day in the taxa-
tion year concerned ;
b) every person not taxable under paragraph (a) but who carried on
a business in the province at any time in the taxation year con-
cerned ;
c) every person resident outside Canada who was employed in the
province at any time in the taxation year concerned73
and section 3(a) of An Act to Amend the Retail Sales Tax Act
which states that :74
No retailer shall ship, deliver or cause to be delivered any movable
property to a person ordinarily residing in this province or carrying
on business therein, for consumption or use by such person in this
province, unless, upon his application, a registration certificate has
been delivered to him under this Act and is in force at the time of ship-
ment or delivery .
The vendor or retailer acts as the agent of the Minister and he
must account for and remit to him the Quebec sales tax collected
on goods purchased outside the province for consumption or use
within the province, on or before the fifteenth day of each month
for the preceding calendar month.75 Revenue officers are empower-
ed to enter the premises of the manufacturer, importer, retailer or
vendor during reasonable hours to examine his books and docu-
ments and establish the correctness of the reports made .78 The pur-
chaser need not report and remit himself the tax on goods bought
outside the Province of Quebec when such a tax is collected by
the retailer. Article 16(a) authorizes the exchange of information
so obtained with other provinces on a reciprocal basis. Fines and,
in default, imprisonment, are provided for persons who sell or
71 S.Q., 1963, c. 25 .
11 See also s. 166 providing for the exchange ofinformation on a recip-
rocal basis.
11 Retail Sales Tax Act, R.S.Q ., 1941, c. 88, as am . S.Q ., 1944, c. 20,
1960-61, cc . 32, 40, 43, 1963, c. 27, 3(a) (1) . According to s. 2 (13) "re-
tailer" means a person whose establishment is outside the Province but
who solicits therein, through a representative or by the distribution o£
catalogues or other means of publicity, orders for moveable property
from persons ordinarily residing or carrying on business in this Province,
for consumption or use by them in this Province .
"Retailer" also includes a person who, acting as representative of a
business house outside the Province, solicits, receives or accepts from
persons ordinarily residing or carrying on business in this Province, orders
for moveable property for delivery in this Province, for use and consump-
tion by them in this Province, when the business house which he represents
is not registered as a retailer in this Province ."
75 Ibid., s. 10 . See also ss. 4, 5, 6. 76 Ibid., s . 14 (1).
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deliver movable property in Quebec without a registration certi-
ficate." As the authors of the bill indicated in their explanatory
notes, the object of most of the provisions of the Act is to improve
the collection of the sales tax payable on movable property that
is not sold in Quebec but is delivered there to a consumer or user. 78
Today a tax on retail sales is a major elementinthetaxstructures
of most Canadian provinces. When interprovincial transactions are
involved the provinces find it difficult to enforce payment of the
tax "thus they lose revenue, and incentive is given to buy outside
the province to the detriment of in-province merchants . One effect
is to limit the potential tax rate which can be employed to meet
expenditure needs. On the other hand, since . each province has
developed its sales tax without regard to the taxes of other prov-
inces, some discriminatory double taxation occurs, when two or
more provinces tax the same purchaser"."
The Quebec legislation by requiring, registration of firms that
solicit business by catalogues sent into the province or accept
orders for delivery in the province will render the enforcement of
the sales tax much more effective . However there is no teeth in the
law as long as there is no way offorcing out of province merchants
to register . The passage of the reciprocal enforcement legislation
is designed, if acted upon by other provinces, indirectly to compel
them tô register and collect the tax or face a suit in the local courts
of the jurisdictions where they are established.
The new amendment to article 79 of the Quebec Code of Civil
Procedure is based on American precedent. As early as 1928 there
existed in blew York a law providing for the reciprocal collection
of succession duties .$° In 1951 the State of Arkansas adopted a
statute for the enforcement of any sister State tax on a reciprocal
basis." Most American States now have similar statutes .
It must be emphasized that the Quebec legislation applies only
to taxes levied by the provinces." The recognition and enforcement
77 Ibid., s . 17.
78 From a constitutional law point of view it may be outside Quebec
jurisdiction to require an Ontario merchant to act as tax collector or agent
for the Province of Quebec or to require him to open his books to Quebec
inspectors unless he has an agent there who can make enforceable sales
contracts in Quebec. See Beck, Report of 1963 Conference of Tax Foun-
dation, p . 307 .
79 In general see John F. Due, The Provincial Sales Taxes and Their
Relationship to the Federal Sales Tax (1963), 11 Can. Tax J . 523, at p . 528.
In Ontario see An Act to Impose a Tax on Retail Sales, S.O ., 1960-61,
c . 91, as am . 1961-62, c . 126, 1962-63, c . 127, esp . ss . 1(3), 1(8), 2(7) 6(1) .
$1 N.Y. Laws of 1928, c. 330, art. 1-A, par . 248-p .
8' Ark. Act 73 of 1951 .
82 What happens when as in Ontario, provincial taxes are collected by
the Federal Government? See art. 10 of the agreement between Ontario
and the Federal Government .
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of provincial taxes or judgments for taxes depends upon the exis-
tence of reciprocity which it is assumed could be judicial or legis-
lative . We have here a case of reciproca utilitas . Such reciprocity
applies to the right of action and not the type of tax sought to be
enforced . It would have been better, it seems to me, for the Govern-
ment of the Province of Quebec to have negotiated directly with
other provincial governments on this touchy subject in order to
determine the exact conditions of reciprocity as well as the types
of tax claims to be enforced . Should Ontario become sufficiently
interested in collecting its sales tax on interprovincial transactions
it might agree to enforce the Quebec sales tax on a reciprocal basis .
Until such time the traditional rule is likely to remain in force
particularly if it is felt that the out of province enforcement of the
Quebec sales tax will foster Quebec business. So far no other
province of Canada has passed a similar statute. Only through the
development of specific arrangements among the provinces can a
satisfactory solution be reached to avoid possible tax evasion.
An alternative to the Quebec approach would be for each prov-
ince to agree to act as agent for all other provinces levying sales
or other taxes . For instance retailers in Ontario would collect sales
taxes on merchandise bought in Ontario for delivery in other
provinces. The amount would depend upon the tax of the province
involved . The tax would then be remitted to the Ontario Gov-
ernment which in turn would pass it along to this province on a
reciprocal basis.
A comprehensive type of agreement could be as follows
The contracting provinces undertake to lend assistance and support
to each other in the collection of taxes that are the subject of the
present agreement together with interest, costs and fines not of a
penal character.
A schedule annexed to the agreement would list the taxes to
which it applies. The forum should also be allowed to refuse to
comply with the request for enforcement for reasons of strong
public policy . Of course a foreign judgment for taxes should have
the same effect as an administrative assessment and be conclusive
on the merits . Assuming that a province under such a reciprocal
agreement holds a valid tax claim, various problems arise in de-
termining what procedural devices are available as a means of en-
forcement . The agreement could provide that claims presented
thereunder will be enforced in accordance with the laws applicable
to the enforcement and collection of the taxes of the forum and
that neither province shall be obligated to carry out administrative
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measures at variance with its own regulations and practice. This
approach would acknowledge the traditional rule that the lex foci
applies to procedural matters, and enable the applying province
to benefit from the full array of procedural weapons available in
the enforcing province for the collection of its own taxes. The
agreement could also state that out of province tax claims can only
be enforced by a judicial suit in the courts of the enforcing province
in which a moneyjudgment is sought . This is the most obvious but
not necessarily the most efficacious method of enforcing foreign
tax claims." It is the one that will be applied in Quebec once re-
ciprocity is established .
Still another method would be to allow the enforcing province
itself to maintain proceedings for the benefit of the province seeking
to collect its taxes.
V. International Conventions.
Tax agreements between Canada and other nations which apply
to federal income taxes and succession duties exclusively, deal
mainly with the avoidance of double taxation and only incidentally
with the prevention of fiscal evasions¢ For instance in the Canada-
United States income tax agreement, provision is made for the
exchange of information and for consultation between the revenue
authorities of both States.s5 Such information includes periodic
annual returns as well as specific information regarding any tax-
laws."' Although the information provisions of these agreements
have been supplemented by extensive regulations they do not con-
tain mutual enforcement sections with the result that the machina-
tions of artful tax delinquents are still for the most part left unim-
83 Note that s . 118 of the Federal Income Tax Act, R.S.C., 1952, c . 148,
as am., provides that "All taxes, interest, penalties, costs and other amounts
payable under the Act are debts due to Her Majesty and recoverable as
such in the Exchequer Court of Canada or any other Court of competent
jursidiction or in any other manner provided by this Act" . One of the
several remedies made available for the recovery of taxes by this section
is the action of debt against the delinquent taxpayer.
84 Canada- U.S.A . Income Tax Convention, S.C., 1943-44, c . 21, as
am . 1944-45, c . 31, 1950, c. 27, 1951 (2nd sess .) c. 5, 1956, c. 35, arts .
XVIII, XIX, XX (also succession duties, S.C., 1960-61, c . 19) ; For other
income tax conventions see France, S.C., 1951 (1st sess .) c . 40, as'am . 1952,
c . 18, art . 19 ; United Kingdom, S.C., 1946, c. 38, as am . 1950, c. 50, s . 10,
art . XIV ; Sweden, S.C., 1951 (1st sess .), c . 42, art. 18 ; New Zealand, S .C .,
1947-48, c . 34, as am. 1950, c. 50, s . 10, art. 14 ; Ireland, S.C., 1955, c . 10, art.
14 ; Denmark, S.C ., 1956, c. 5, art. 14 ; Germany, S.C., 1956, c . 33, art . 17 ;
South Africa, S.C ., 1957, c. 18, art. 10 ; Netherlands, S.C ., 1957, c. 16 as
am., 1960, c. 18, art . 19 ; Australia, S.C., 1957-58, c. 24, art. 14 ; Belgium,
S.C ., 1958, c. 12, art . 14 (not yet proclaimed in force) ; Congo, S.C ., 1958,
c . 13 (not yet proclaimed in force) ; Finland, S.C ., 1959, c. 20, art . 15 ;
Norway, (not yet proclaimed in force), art . 23 .
15 Ibid., arts . XVIII, XIX. $1 Ibid., art . XX.
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peded. It is to be hoped that in future negotiations United States of
America v. Harden will induce the federal government to change its
approach to the problem of tax evasion or avoidance and press for
the inclusion in any new treaty of provisions for the reciprocal
enforcement of tax claims .$?
Conclusion
The time has came to relegate to history the rule enunciated by
Lord Mansfield almost two centuries ago. Present conditions are
such that full co-operation should exist in the field of taxation
particularly on the interprovincial level.
Although the enforcement of tax claims in favour of foreign
nations may present problems that are more delicate than when
provincial taxes are involved, due to differences in the taxing
systems prevailing in the world which could perhaps be solved
by international treaties, it still seems that a formulation of general
conflict rules dealing with the problem of recognition and enforce-
ment of foreign taxes irrespective of reciprocity is the best solution.
For instance any foreign judgment or claim for taxes based upon
the residence (income), domicile (succession) of the taxpayer, or
sales or the earning of income or the existence of property within
the taxing jurisdiction, should be enforced in Canadian courts
provided such taxes are not offensive to our notions of public
policy as applied to revenue matters and personal jurisdiction
is obtained over the defendant .
With the tax burden becoming increasingly heavy due to the
tremendous responsibilities incurred by modern States in all areas
of human activity and in the light ofprevalent conceptions with re
spect to the justice of taxation, it is absolutely necessary to elim-
inate all possibilities of tax evasion or avoidance. Within Canada
the need is for effective extra-provincial enforcement of all legit-
imate tax liabilities. In view of the attitude of Canadian courts in
United States of America v. Harden and the possible extension of
the revenue rule to cover extra-provincial collection, the legislatures
of the various provinces should act quickly to prevent Canada
from continuing to offer a legally respectable asylum to the itin-
erant tax dodger .
s' In general see International Enforcement of Tax Claims (1950),
50 Cal. L . Rev . 490 .
